

Cultivating a Therapeutic Self

ABSTRACT

A paradigm shift has occurred in cognitive science from what's been called 'I-psychology' or 'cognitivism', to 'e-psychology' or 'enactivism'. Although 'e-psychology' now occupies, as one of its proponents claims, the cafes and wine-bars of cognitive science, it is still "the barbarian at the gates" of clinical and, to a lesser extent, counselling psychology. This paper explores this paradigm shift and some of the implications for psychotherapy. In this new paradigm, the practitioner is no longer positioned as a transcendent Kantian observer of others, as the 'scientist-practitioner' model proposed, but a highly responsive being open to being changed themselves by the therapeutic conversation they are part of. Outcome monitoring tools assist the therapist stay ethically attuned to the client, as the client becomes better attuned to the world. Ethically, in this new paradigm, attunement to the world, and not just adjustment to society, becomes more central; and this facilitates further 'steps to an ecology of mind' (Bateson, 1972).

KEY WORDS: Enactivism, Wittgenstein, Foucault, Parrhēsia, psychotherapy, indigenous knowledge

Many trace the origins of what Hutto (2013) conveniently calls ‘e-
psychology’ to Varela’s, Thompson’s, and Rosch’ 1991 book, *The
Embodied Mind*. However, like any paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1962), there
are of course no clear starting points, and we can see this way of
thinking extending back into the mists of time, to include some of the
mystical thinking of many of the major religions. Currently, ‘e-
psychology’ is a federation of related schools of thought, such as
enactivism, embodied cognition, extended cognition, and complexity
theory; each giving stress to different aspects of this new paradigm.
Enactivists (e. g. Varela et al, 1991) tend to stress how we are actively
engaged (there are more nerves to the senses than from them) in
perception and meaning; we are not passive recipients of experience.
Due to this bodily engagement with the world, ‘embodied cognition’
places emphasis on how our thinking is structured by bodily actions
and metaphors; for example, when the smiling muscles are engaged
we comprehend pleasant sentences faster, or happy is ‘up’ and sad is
‘down’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Extended cognition stresses that
these mental processes extend beyond the body to include circuits of
activity our attention flows around when we engage in particular
activities; objects in the environment become part of our ‘mind’ (Clark
& Chalmers, 1998). In addition, complexity theory tends to stress how
there are ‘emergent properties’ in the swarm-like active systems we
are participating in (Byrne & Callaghan, 2013). In brief, this new
paradigm offers an alternative to the dualism of Descartes and Kant,

offering a more immediate, intimate and responsible relationship with nature.

Descartes, Kant, and Cognitivism

Usually considered the father of mind/body dualism, Descartes not only separated 'mind' from 'body', but from everything in the world. He suggested a division between 'res cogitans', which was the immaterial realm of thought; and a 'res extensa', which was the material world. By way of contrast, consider Wittgenstein, where 'mind' and 'world' are not divided from each other: "The world is the totality of facts, not things" (1961, §1.1). For Descartes (1641/2013), the material world was seen as a clockwork machine obeying the laws of causality and mathematics; and these laws could be discovered through the main attribute of 'the mind', reason. Hume (1739/2003) questioned Descartes' idea that causality resided in the world, suggesting instead that it was an inference of the observing mind; after all, we only had sense impressions. Kant (1781/2008) agreed with Hume, and said 'mind' was not a passive Cartesian mirror, but was an active agent constructing the world. However, unlike Hume, Kant did not think that causality was learnt and then projected onto the world, he said it came with 'mind' as one of a dozen *a priori* 'categories' for ordering the sense data. Space, time, substance, as well as causality are amongst these 'transcendental' categories that come with 'mind' that allows us to perceive an ordered world. Piaget (Callaway, 2001)

and Leahy (1996, p.10) mistakenly called these 'schemas', but for Kant a schema was derived (computed) from the interaction of the 'categories' with the sense data (including the information data from language). For Kant, although we can't have unmediated access to the world, as scientists, we can now discover particular empirical causal laws, as we have this *a priori* faculty making sense of what we turn our attention to, which we can then, couple with a scientific method or discipline for verification (or falsifiability) (e.g., Cirera, 1994; Popper, 1959). This is generally considered the development of the Enlightenment mind, which has brought us into the modern world of greater longevity and creature comforts (for some). In summary, the claim is that we have a transcendent mind constructing a world we don't have direct access to, and with the aid of empirical tools we can judge which constructions (schemas) are the most valid.

Two of the major routes (amongst others) that brought this Cartesian-Kantian epistemology into Western clinical psychology has been via the adoption of the 'scientist-practitioner' model in 1949 by the APA and its subsequent global spread; and the rapid spread of cognitivism, especially as the technique of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) (Jones & Mehr, 2007). Cognitivists, such as Leahy (1996) and Beck (Beck, 1976; Knapp & Beck, 2008) reiterate Kant's view that as we don't have direct access to reality (including other people), we need to utilise scientific tools to make a psychological assessment of the client, thereby getting to "know" them as a reality (Purton, 2014). Because

clients also have a partial view of reality, their problem is considered to stem from invalid constructions (schemata) they have made of the world and themselves (i. e. the meanings they have attached to the facts, not the facts themselves). An assessment of these leads to a diagnosis or formulation of the problem; we can now apply, as a kind of rhetorical lever, an empirically validated treatment technique to assist them. The person of the therapist is largely left out of this approach, and the focus upon finding the most effective rhetorical lever.

Critiquing the Enlightenment

With its cries of liberty and autonomy Kant (1784/1996) described the Enlightenment as “man’s [sic] emergence from his self-incurred immaturity”, claiming that we were now able to use our own reasoning to understand life, and thus no longer needed to rely on the Church for guidance. Despite the immense technological benefits that have resulted, the Enlightenment has not been without its critics. Just twenty years after Kant’s declaration, Hegel blamed the Enlightenment for the guillotine and the bloody sacrifice of “love, spirituality, and tradition” (McMahon, 2001). Increasingly, those on the political left saw a mechanical materialism in it, which led to the devaluation of art, literature and culture. The philosopher Wittgenstein, for example, had an affinity with Oswald Spengler’s anti-Enlightenment treatise, *The Decline of the West*; and once told a friend: “Even in Brahms I can begin

to hear the sound of machinery” (Rhees, 1981, p.127). Psychology wasn’t spared, for example, past APA president George Albee lamented that we sold our soul to the devil at Boulder in adopting the ‘scientist-practitioner’ model, for we had turned our back on the art of our discipline (Albee, 1998).

Perhaps the most well-known voice in the dialogue between the proponents and critics of the Enlightenment in the twentieth century was Michel Foucault. Whilst Foucault saw redeeming features in some Enlightenment reasoning more and more, as his work progressed; he remained critical of Kant’s transcendental mind throughout (Rabinow & Rose, 2003; Han, 2002; Gutting, 2003). Foucault (1994) questioned Kant’s proposal that we accept the *a priori* transcendent mind as the starting point of knowledge. He argued (2008a) that Kant’s so-called *a priori* categories that order the sense data are relative historical discursive formations, which could be uncovered by a special type of archaeology of knowledge. However, more importantly for the purpose of this paper, he embraced Nietzsche’s (1887/1967) observation that ‘self’ or ‘mind’ is something of a fiction of language. Nietzsche noted that there was no flash apart from the lightening; it was only the noun-verb or subject-predicate structure of our grammar that separates the subject from its actions. Foucault thus reasoned there was no ‘mind’ apart from the thinking in Descartes’ famous maxim, and thus subjects were not philosophical givens. Instead, he

proposed (1991, p.27) the self as experienced was politically constructed, an effect of discourse and institutions.

Foucault rejected Marx's analysis of power, which was centred on production, instead appropriating Nietzsche's 'genealogy', which focused on how certain 'truth' discourses determined human politics ('the art of government'). These truth discourses, uttered by an array of authorities considered competent, make claims about the nature of human beings (Rabinow & Rose, 2003). Usually, within a short time, these 'truths' become part of everyday discourse and institutions are built in their name. Interventions arise from these 'truths' that are applied to the population in the name of health or spiritual purity; usually inviting people to discipline themselves. Although this kind of subjectification of people is interrupted by murderous dictatorships on occasion, a return to what Foucault called 'biopower' usually follows. In recent times, some scholars have begun to look at Foucault's 'biopower' as a form of 'complexity theory' (swarm intelligence), which may shed new light on his work (Olssen, 2008, 2014; Castellani & Hafferty, 2009). Since the eighteenth century, the central form this biopower has taken in Western society is one of 'panopticism' (Foucault, 1977). This is where we are all encouraged to 'gaze' into the mirror of 'normalizing judgements', thus objectifying ourselves as subjects; and modify our behaviour in response to these truths. This generates something of a chronic tension or 'neurosis' within us that we now identify as our 'self' (Burrow, 1953). Foucault was

particularly critical of the 'psy disciplines', disciplines which arose out of this political apparatus, for their role in blindly supporting the maintenance of this form of power (Rose, 1990). More recently, under neo-liberalism, where everyone has been cast as an entrepreneur, there has been a further intensification (empowering) of the individualism and competition panopticism has engendered, and a discouragement of welfare and connectivity with each other and the world (Foucault, 2008b; Read, 2009). Thus for Foucault, this independent self who stands apart from the world is 'fabricated' (1977, p. 142) in the "cruel ingenious cage" (1977, p.383) of panopticism. However, as it is fabricated he began to speculate, especially in the last two years of his life, what "the art of not being governed quite so much" would consist of (Foucault, 1997; Dilts, 2011).

Wittgenstein's Therapy

In recent years, the 'resolute reading' or the 'New Wittgenstein' (Read & Crary, 2000; Fischer, 2011) have given stress to the idea that Wittgenstein's work can be viewed as a form of therapy for the Western mind. He has certainly appealed to the Solution-Focused school of therapy, as he saw psychotherapy and his philosophy as dealing with similar problems, that "...are solved in the literal sense of the word – dissolved like a lump of sugar in water" (2005, §421). He thought that both psychotherapists and philosophers were dealing

with problems with orientation or people “not knowing our way about” (1958, §123); and these were not intellectual problems requiring an answer, but relational in that they required us to relate to our environment differently (Bouveresse, 1995; Shotter, 2011). For Wittgenstein, philosophy is not a ‘love of knowledge’ where one takes a position on various ideas, and ends up being labeled a ‘realist’, a ‘phenomenologist’, a ‘positivist’, etc. ; instead Wittgenstein wanted to scrape all pictures of the world off the window so we can see (or be with) the world directly and clearly. Perspicuity is the goal (Moyal-Sharrock, 2007). Any theory or doctrine about the world was an indication of philosophical confusion. So philosophy as a love of conceptual knowledge came to an end with Wittgenstein, if everyone got what he was pointing to.

In his early work, he described the creation and dissolution of problems in terms of two ‘wills’ in play: “*There are two godheads: the world and my independent I*” (1984, p.74, 9/7/1916). “*The world is independent of my will*” (1961, §6.373). This doesn’t mean however that there is a transcendental subject separate from the action, for “[t]he act of will ... is the action itself” (1984, p.87, 4/11/1916). Now “*In order to live happily I must be in agreement with the world...That is to say: I am doing the will of God*” (1984, p.75, 9/7/1916).

Consequently, my will and “God’s will” can become attuned and “*I am my world*” (1961, §5.63). “*The fact that life is problematic shows that the shape of your life does not fit into life’s mould. So you must change*

the way you live and, once your life does fit into the mould, what is problematic will disappear" (1980, p 27). So when problems are dissolved, I have regained my attunement with the world and can say "*Now I can go on*" (1958, §151).

In his later work, he placed greater stress on the idea that because some words have more than one meaning, we can be beguiled at times when our attention shifts from one of its meanings to another without us noticing ("*..the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language*" – 1958, §109). Moyal-Sharrock (2013) claims his most important contribution was to revive the animal in us, "something instinctive, thought-free, reflex-like" (p.263). So rather than see language use as the manipulation of symbols (a computer metaphor) as cognitivists tends to do, Wittgenstein stressed a spontaneous, embodied, anticipatory, mutual responsivity occurring between us, as we 'danced' in attention sharing activities he called 'language games'. These not only provided the context of our utterances, but also allowed us to complete each other's sentences at times (Shotter, 2004; Drury 2014; 2015). So a 'knot' or conceptual confusion occurs, say if we use the word 'know' to mean "know that" at one point in our conversation, and then use it to mean "know how" at a later point.

This particular example of linguistic 'bewitchment' is an important one for Wittgenstein (1958), as he saw us as having privileged conceptual knowledge ('how high is Mont Blanc') over both perceptual knowledge

(that is the sound of a clarinet), and 'know how' (how to use the word 'game') during the industrial era; and not recognizing that the latter two are more basic to life. One consequence was that we had done no more than moved from one form of superstition to another with the Enlightenment. Whereas traditional religions shifted our attention from this world to a conceptual one behind the scenes where angels and devils controlled us, scientism did something similar by shifting our attention to a world of scientific explanation where imaginary laws governed the universe. "Science is a way of sending us to sleep, [therapeutic] philosophy must serve to wake us up" (Wittgenstein, 1980, p.5). This 'awakening' is more a matter of 'know how' (combined with perceptual knowledge) than conceptual knowledge; revived as animals in this world rather than intellectuals with our head in another. He advocated doing away with all explanations.

We see an example of this awakening in the five-stage model of skill acquisition developed by the Dreyfus brothers (1980), who were scholars of Wittgenstein. They showed that as expertise developed, we relied less and less on the rule-book, and more and more on immediate unreflective situational responses. A shift from 'know that' deliberations to 'know how' intuitions; "trust the force, Luke". A return to the natural 'know how' of life (albeit with a new skill). "Deliberation is certainly used by experts, if time permits, but is done for the purpose of improving intuition, not replacing it" (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005, p.779). In their original paper, written for the US Air

Force, they described this expert pilot level as: “rather than being aware they are flying an airplane, they have the experience that they are flying” (1980, p.12). The airplane “has become so much part of him [sic] that he need be no more aware of it than he is of his own body” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 30). Like Nietzsche then, there is no subject standing apart from the action. K. Anders Ericsson’s (2006) work provides empirical support to this, claiming that pattern recognition (perceptual knowledge) replaces rule-following (conceptual knowledge); e.g. the chess grandmaster recognizes some 50,000 patterns that they react to reflexively, which takes 10,000 hours of deliberate practice to achieve. The Dreyfus brothers had a chess grandmaster counting aloud whilst playing multiple games; “look ma, no thinking”. Ericsson (2006) notes that experts “often cannot articulate their knowledge because much of their knowledge is tacit” (p. 24). Both Ericsson and the Dreyfus brothers indicate that the expert’s ‘gaze’ is also more *present*; on the road so to speak, and not taking it off to look at the dashboard of rules whilst driving.

Enactive Extended Cognition.

Bateson (1972) once asked where a blind man’s self began – at the handle of his stick?, at the tip?, halfway up? (pp. 324 & 466). As he concludes, the question is nonsense, for what is happening is that the man’s attention is flowing around a circuit that includes the man, the stick and the street. He goes on to say that when he sits down for

lunch a different circuit comes into play. For the Dreyfus' expert pilot, the aeroplane is part of him, as the car is to most of us who have mastered driving. Heidegger called this extended cognition – where the car felt like part of me, '*dasien*', our usual way of being in the world (1962). In Madhyamaka Buddhism, samsara is nirvana (everyday mind is the enlightened mind) (Suzuki, 1932). As Bateson noted, this discarding of the physical boundary between ourselves and the world seemed a little scary for those of us raised in what he called a Newtonian society, or the Enlightenment culture, because we were led to believe that we were separate minds standing apart from the world. However, this is something we have always been doing in some form or another. Shotter (2012) offers us numerous descriptions of therapeutic conversations taking on a life of their own, much as they often do with close friends at times. Some are calling such therapeutic conversations 'relational mindfulness' conversations (e. g. Falb & Pargament, 2012; Ogden & Fisher, 2015). Family therapist, Lyn Hoffman (2001) says a process she calls 'tempathy' occurs in such conversations: new ideas seem to get generated out of the ether, so to speak (p. 243). Shotter (2012) calls this "knowing of a third kind"; the dialogue has emergent properties when we are at one with it.

We begin to see how this comes about when we review Noë's (2004; 2009) or Gibson's (1979) ideas on the nature of perception, or perceptual intelligence. Both these Wittgensteinian scholars rejected the widespread idea that the senses were bringing data into the brain

for a Cartesian-Kantian mind to interpret into pictures or music etc. If there is no homunculus, or little man inside your head, but an enactive 'mind' that extends to include the activity you are involved in, then perception is the development of sensorimotor skills for the purpose of keeping us attuned or on track in our relationship with the world. We have more nerves going to the senses than coming from them, and like the blind man with his cane, we are using our senses to probe the interdependent relationship we have with the world to stay attuned to it. Most will be familiar with the 'change blindness' or 'inattention blindness' experiments, where it is shown that our intentions will 'colour' the world we see. Perhaps the most famous of these is the man in the gorilla suit you don't see, who walks through a group of basketball players, whilst you are busy counting the number of times the white-shirted players pass the ball. As we "lose ourselves" in some activity, our 'probing' or anticipatory sensing allows us to perform better, but at the cost of not noticing other events that might be going on. So when we do this in conversation, we find ourselves completing the other's sentence, or seemingly to be almost telepathic at times. Bakhtin (1986) and Voloshinov (1929/1986) began exploring these ideas in some depth nearly 80 years ago (Shotter, 2012); but they have been slow to find a place in Western clinical and counselling psychology.

Interdependent Relationships

According to cognitivism, we require a 'Theory of Mind' (ToM) to understand each other. Cognitivists assume data is coming into the brain, in the form of language and/or non-verbal behaviour, and we need a ToM to interpret this. But as Wittgenstein observed 80 years ago, we need no theory or simulation of other before responding:

"We see emotion". As opposed to what? We do not see facial contortions and make inferences from them (like a doctor framing a diagnosis) to joy, grief, boredom. We describe the face immediately as sad, radiant, bored, even when we are unable to give any other description of the features. – (Wittgenstein, 1967, §225).

Cognitivism's faulty assumption that we needed a ToM to socially navigate arose from a 'passive recipient of data that needed interpreting' model, and Piaget's claim that the early sensorimotor stage had to be abandoned for adult cognition, or the Cartesian-Kantian mind to arise. But as Thelen and colleagues (2001) have shown, it is simpler to see that sensorimotor responses become refined and more flexible as we matured; and thus ToM is "nonsense", as there is no separate consciously interpreting mind, just a reacting one (Leudar & Costall, 2009). So for Wittgenstein, and phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty (1945/1996) and Levinas (1998), our intersubjectivity is based upon immediate responses we are having to each other (Overgaard, 2007). These same writers see an ethical demand in this intersubjectivity: a *"primitive reaction to tend, to treat, the part that hurts when someone else is in pain: and not*

merely when oneself is ... - a response of concern, sympathy, helping”
(Wittgenstein, 1967, §540). Levinas (1998) makes it clear that there is a non-cognitive, or pre-cognitive ethics in play here; our first response to other is an ethical one (Gantt & Williams, 2002). Thus for therapy:
“The road from mental illness to mental health is not to create from a shattered ego a fortress ego, but to regain one’s obligations, one’s responsibilities to and for the other” (Cohen, 2002, p. 48). Such responsibilities and obligations arise from our natural responsivity to each other, and not primarily from deliberations as Kant presumed. As we have seen above, “deliberation ...is ... for the purpose of improving intuition”.

As our responsivity to each other is direct, and mostly there is no separate mind interpreting other, then *“it is correct to say ‘I know what you are thinking’, and wrong to say ‘I know what I am thinking’.* (*A whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a drop of grammar*)” (Wittgenstein, 1958, p.222e). This is Wittgenstein’s famous ‘private language argument’ in a nutshell (we cannot have a language known only to ourselves). As I start out, and spend most of my life with no separate mind observing my body (myself), I express my experiences in various exclamations and gestures – e.g. “ouch”, “wow”, etc.

However, when I tell the dentist I have a pain in my lower left second molar, I appear to be offering a description of my problem; I have taken a position of being a separate mind with knowledges about myself. Wittgenstein (1958, §244) argued nonetheless that I am

merely expressing my pain in a more sophisticated form, as I have been taught to by my culture. Merleau-Ponty (1945/1996) got at this distinction by positing that primarily intersubjectivity had us just reacting to each other or the world; but a second level of intersubjectivity arose where we assumed that we were distinctive self-conscious individuals. Thus for both philosophers, 'Being-with-others' (or the world) is more primary than any observational stance we might take; primarily, I am expressing what I am thinking-feeling and can see the natural expressions of your thinking-feeling. The Rizla game springs to mind here. In reflecting on this, family therapist Tom Andersen (2001) noted that "I can only see myself [or know myself objectively] or the effect of what I do in the eyes of the Other, I depend on the Other' (p. 11).

Goethe's Delicate Empiricism and Indigenous Genealogy

Goethe described Newtonian science as an "empirico-mechanico-dogmatic torture chamber", as the scientist is encouraged to fit nature to a theory, a procrustean bed, a conceptual map (Heller, 1952, p. 18). It's a method where we turn away from the phenomena we study, and "cudgel" our brain for a theoretical schemata that it might fit (Seamon & Zajonc, 1998). However in practice, Newton appears to say he actually just sat quietly contemplating his subject for some years until "little by little"... "dawnings slowly opened" (Westfall, 1983). Goethe offered an alternative to Newtonian science in his 'delicate

empiricism', a method of science more like Newton's actual contemplative approach, where 'witness'-knowledge was prioritized over 'aboutness'-knowledge" (Shotter, 2005; Drury, 2006). He invited us to make ourselves utterly identical with the 'Other' we wish to understand until we gain a sense of it as a process-in-context. This might be a geological feature, a botanical plant, a sub-atomic particle, or a client in a therapist's office. Perceptual intelligence is called for (Lane, 2008; Noë, 2012).

We are 'moved' by Other as we learn to dance with its form in its context, and our first expressions are unlikely to be descriptive so much as exclamations as we develop a sense of its ebbs and flows. Later we offer the description – 'it is the lower left second molar'. We see this relationship between 'witness' and 'aboutness' knowledge in Salmond's (2005) comparisons of Polynesian and European epistemology. Eighteenth century Polynesian navigators were apprenticed into knowledge of "the sea, stars and winds, until this knowledge became reflexive and embodied" (p. 176). 'Know that' or 'aboutness'-knowledge, for the Polynesians ('mātauranga' in Māori), is in service of the 'witness'-knowledge or 'know-how' ('mōhiotanga'). She adds that although some of the experienced European sailors had also acquired embodied knowledge of the sea, stars and winds, they were largely guided by their technical instruments and drilled routines. That is to say conceptual 'know that' was prioritized over 'know how' (or 'witness knowledge'). The advantage of the

conceptual method is that the knowledge gathered, in the form of new maps or charts, was now available for subsequent mariners that might follow. The cost lies in atrophy of 'know how' skills, including a more intimate relationship with the world.

It seems then that Polynesian 'knowledge acquisition' or 'science' is similar to Goethe's 'delicate empiricism' in that it saw an intuitive, embodied, reflexive knowledge (*'mōhiotanga'* in Māori) as being a "higher form of knowing than that suggested by *mātauranga*" (Royal, 2007, p. 21). Like Goethe, Sadler (2007) suggests the method here is to make oneself utterly identical with 'Other', so that the '*Whanaungatanga*' or network of relationships (Marsden, 2003) it stems from is sensed. '*Nohopuku*', a form of meditation may be required to achieve this (Royal, 1996; Salmond, 2013). Thus a natural unity of the world is attuned to, as many meditators have noted, and once achieved, the genealogy (whakapapa) of a particular phenomenon shows itself (Roberts, 2013). Newtonian or Western science aims at a 'grand theory of everything' (or at minimum, that a particular hypothesis is coherent with other theories (the Duhem-Quine thesis)), but this Polynesian 'science' begins, so to speak, with a 'grand experience of everything' (sometimes called '*Te Ao Mārama*'). The genealogies are 'divined' or 'dowsed' from this experience, and are then put to the purpose of attuning us all to the unity (Drury, 2011).

This can be seen when we look at the parables accompanying the whakapapa. Whereas genealogies in Western biology are based on assumptions of shared genetic inheritance from a common ancestor, whakapapa genealogy allows habitat, behaviour, and morphology to play a role. This allows for more than one genealogy for a particular phenomenon, as descent can be ascribed to different ancestors (Roberts, 2013). 'Genealogy' as whakapapa seems to come closer to Foucault's (1980) use of that word, in that mātauranga are a tool of governance. This is because a parable accompanies the genealogy, tracing it back to ancient ancestors; and the parable contains moral guidelines (tikanga). The whakapapa thus 'positions' us in our relationship with the kauri tree, the kumara, the kiore rat, and so on, as well as each other (Roberts & Wills, 1998; Gillett, 2009; Roberts, 2013). As habitat plays a role in a whakapapa it is not surprising to learn that mātauranga ā-iwi (tribal knowledge) varies, and thus we may be 'positioned' differently in different whakapapa (Doherty, 2012). There appears to be an opportunity here to develop narrative therapy (White & Epston, 1989) in a kaupapa form.

Virtue and Parrhēsia

Just as narrative therapy (White, 2007) re-positions clients by locating an alternative or 'preferred self' within a 'marginalised discourse', so too did Foucault (2001a) when he began to explore how we might constitute ourselves more, rather than be totally 'fabricated' by the

knowledge-power structures (*'dispostifs'*) of modern society. He identified a "Cartesian moment" occurring about a thousand years ago when the Catholic Church rejected the idea that what the Greeks called *'epimeleia heautou'* ('care of the self') was a necessary precursor to the truth. This allowed Descartes some centuries later, to claim that spiritual or ethical exercises are not necessary for knowledge of truth. Rationality or reason alone could now allow us access to the truth, whereas "(b)efore Descartes, one could not be impure, immoral, and know the truth" (2000a, p.279). To the modern reader the idea that some sort of 'care of the self' to achieve moral purity is a necessary precursor to accessing the truth sounds like some sort of self-indulgent moral dandyism; it would generate some sort of sanctimonious egoism that is more likely to give one a biased view of reality. This is because conceptual knowledge, perceived by a disembodied mind (and later transcendental mind), is post-Descartes, privileged over wisdom. Wisdom is the kind of knowledge we sense with the heart. As the expertise studies show, it is a perceptual knowledge combined with a form of attunement, so does require some know how discipline. Following Wittgenstein's private language argument, when socialised expresses itself in 'know that' utterances. (Recall that in Wittgenstein's private language argument, when I tell the dentist it is the "lower left second molar" I am not offering a description so much as a sophisticated or socialised expression of my suffering.)

This early “Cartesian moment”, when the head lost touch with the heart, occurred when theologians began focusing on the idea that there was a universally shared rational nature to humanity, and began requiring people to (conceptually) know they were sinners, ‘confess’ their sins, and take guidance from the church. It would seem that the theologians had lost faith that *epimeleia heautou* would generate self-discipline, and so took over the provision of discipline, and at the same time, re-wrote the meaning of *gnōthi seauton* (the Delphic Oracle’s ‘know thyself’) (Foucault, 2011). For Foucault, *gnōthi seauton* originally meant perceptual knowledge of oneself. As Lane (2008) put it: “when I began to let go of the images and concepts of me, ...the notion of me as some separate and historical being died – and a human being was born” (p.3). For Foucault (2000b) this is an aspect of *epimeleia heautou* or ‘care of the self’ (Foucault, 2000b). This ‘care of self’ was not a form of moral dandyism as we might interpret it today, but referred more to the kind of self-discipline we might engage in whilst caring for others. A relationship with the self is formed through a relationship with another; for the Greek and Roman senators, this was “the wife”, “the boy” and “the citizens” one governed (Foucault, 1984). More recently other scholars, most notably Levinas (1998), have also noted how a ‘self’ could be called into existence or being by compassion and obligation to others (Gantt & Williams, 2002; Overgaard, 2007). Foucault (2000c) describes how this occurred amongst some groups of soldiers in World War I.

This kind of intersubjective ethics or ascetics of the ancients (*epimeleia heautou*) is not usually a struggle against oneself; as it is for more individuated people in modern life 'fighting' addictions. Rather, it is more like an experience a lot of women have, where on discovering they are pregnant, do not find it difficult to stop smoking or drinking immediately. This then is a disciplining of self, or cultivation of self, that comes from love, as opposed to knowledge and fear. We see an invitation to this form of self-discipline in the therapeutic work of Alan Jenkins (1990, 2009) with men who abuse. Unlike Kant's categorical imperative, this ethic is not arrived at by reason, so much as it is cultivated and embodied as an aesthetic of being. A performative ethics that not only takes care of oneself, but does so in the context of taking care of the other (Hanna, 2014).

In family therapy, this virtue ethic can be cultivated by asking, in keeping with enactive cognitive, 'anticipatory questions'. For example, "You said that amongst the milestones in the development of Johnny's caring, has been his care of his toys, and later his friends; but tell me when do you anticipate he will start caring for you more?" Or "Johnny, you describe well the things you notice about your mate Tim when he's a bit down, even by the way he's walking, and you care for him; but what do you notice about dad that tells you he needs care?" Or "Dad, you have given me a great list of milestones in your own chore development, from putting away toys as a two year old, to lawn mowing at age 12; but tell me, when did you start noticing jobs that

need doing and did them without prompting?” “What did that mean about the person you were becoming?” We might elicit this aspect of humanity in family therapy by asking: “Imagine you are walking home from school, you are on your own and need to go to the toilet urgently. Indeed, you are walking funny. You come round the corner, and there lying in the middle of the road is a three year old who has fallen off her tricycle and is bleeding. What do you do?” We have seen this ethos in the quote from Cohen earlier about regaining one’s obligations and responsibilities to others, and we can see it as central to Seikkula’s (2011) highly successful treatment of psychosis.

Foucault’s therapy for the Western intellect, if we may call it that, which resurrects ‘wisdom’ and ‘virtue’, takes a particular interest in the development of what the Greeks called ‘*parrhēsia*’ or ‘fearless speech’ (Foucault, 2001b). He contrasts this with rhetoric. As we have seen, Wittgenstein’s ‘private language argument’ (or Merleau-Ponty’s ‘primary intersubjectivity’) shows that we give direct expression of what we are sensing and feeling in intimate relationships, and do not have a separate Cartesian-Kantian mind monitoring what we are saying. Thus, “*the parrhēsiastes uses the most direct words and forms of expression he [sic] can find. Whereas rhetoric provides the speaker with technical devices to help him prevail upon the minds of his audience (regardless of the rhetoricians own opinion concerning what he says)*” (2001b, p.12). Foucault (2010) tells us that following the death of the Greek statesman Pericles in 429 BC “...*parrhēsia and democracy no*

longer get on so well together" (p. 182). A golden age of Greek politics had come to an end, as truth telling gave way to flattery and rhetoric. Parrhēsiastes require humility, as learning, which includes admission of error (something punishable in some current risk management systems), is essential in this development of ourselves as "*a work of art*" (1984; 2011). Unlike the rhetorician, those seeking parrhēsia have to open themselves to other (to develop the 'know how' aspect), thus placing themselves at risk of violence to oneself, as Socrates discovered when he was sentenced to death for his 'fearless speech' (2011, p. 11). Galen had recognised the importance of parrhēsia for physicians, as they needed their own ethical authority rather than being subjected to the rules and influences of external authorities. Foucault (2010) claims the cultivation, or realisation of this virtue, is essential for "*...the man [sic] who is responsible for directing others, and particularly for directing them in their effort, their attempt to constitute an appropriate relationship to themselves*" (p.6). A highly desirable quality to cultivate in teachers and psychotherapists then, although it may be a while before we see politicians candid about their errors. It is best cultivated, Foucault tells us, not through institutional learning, but by being in conversation with a parrhēsiaste. What's more "*...he [sic] may be a personal friend, or even a lover*" (2011, p.6). Thus, whereas Wittgenstein stresses perspicuity as the outcome of cultivating relational responsivity, Foucault emphasizes parrhēsia.

Psychotherapy and the therapist's development

As we have seen expertise is the development of know-how skills, and such relational responsivity entails for Foucault, a greater degree of self-constitution and less fabrication of the self by the power-knowledge technologies of society. This relational responsivity or witness knowledge is seen in psychotherapy as the therapeutic alliance and research shows some therapists are consistently better at it than others (Baldwin et al, 2007; Horvath et al, 2011). As the alliance outweighs the technique by at least five to one and predicts outcome more than any other known variable, it obviously lies at the heart of psychotherapy (Anker et al, 2010; Duncan, 2010; Chow et al., 2015). Such considerations have led to a burgeoning body of literature on 'supershrinks'; or how we might constitute ourselves as more effective therapists (Miller, Hubble, & Duncan, 2007). Through the use of routine outcome monitoring feedback tools such as Duncan and Miller's 'Partners for Change Outcome Management System' (PCOMS) or Lambert's 'Outcome Questionnaire 45.2' (OQ45.2), combined with 'deliberate practice', there is a growing body of evidence that psychotherapists can improve immensely and considerably reduce the drop-out rates (Duncan, 2010; Lambert & Shimokawa, 2011).

As a first step, the authors of routine outcome monitoring tools all suggest that if clients are not making progress and/or indicating the alliance is not as should be, involving clients in a discussion on alternative directions may get the therapy back on track again. Chow

(2014) notes that skilled therapists expressed surprise and interest on receiving feedback showing lack of progress or poor alliance; whereas less skilled therapists either ignored the feedback or offered an explanation. De Jong and colleagues (2012) found that half the therapists in their study failed to use the feedback at all! As the 'common factors' research indicates approximately 80% of change is due to client and life factors, (what the client brings to therapy or happenstance), further activation of the client's own resources is seen in the master therapist's response (Anderson & Ogles, 2009; Duncan, 2010). Anderson and Ogles call this "facilitative interpersonal skills" (FIS), Gassmann and Grawe (2006) call it "resource activation" and in Māoridom, this can be seen as part of "manaakitanga" (raising the mana of other). Like other skills, once mastered, this becomes part of the parrhēsiaste's 'know how'. Furthermore, the skilled therapist, like Ericsson's chess grandmasters, recognises other patterns in this situation that they can bring into play without much thought.

As we have seen, Ericsson's (2006) work on expertise suggests it takes 10,000 hours of 'deliberate practice' to be able to recognise these 50,000 patterns, to react to without thought. Recent research by Scott Miller and colleagues (Chow, Miller, et al., 2015), show that "supershrinks" spend two or three times as much time outside of the clinic engaged in activities to improve their performance, compared with average clinicians. Unfortunately, although many therapists profess a keen interest in professional development (Orlinsky &

Rønnestad, 2005), the evidence that untargeted supervision, continuing education or personal therapy translates into more effective (or ethical) practice is lacking (Miller et al., 2016). However Miller and colleagues (2016) report that several long-term studies are now under way to examine how coupling such efforts with outcome monitoring feedback, leads to more effective practice. This is to be expected from Ericsson's work and some less robust evidence now available, Miller claims. Such research will support the claim that Routine Outcome Monitoring tools (ROMs) would be a preferred mechanism to meet the requirements of the NZ Health Practitioners Competency Assurance Act than the current mechanism developed by the Board (Drury, 2016).

Obviously, the professional development activities stemming from ROMs will vary from clinician to clinician and their learning style at different times in their life (Chow et al, 2015). Duncan (2010) for example, advocates extracting key questions from a number of the EBTs in the domain one works in, as it may allow therapists to work within the client's theory of change, or as Insoo Kim Berg said – “leave no footprints”. The empirical evidence is growing that most clinicians performance will improve when their ‘deliberate practice’ is outcome focused; and the particular method should not be prescribed by licensing boards or other third parties, especially without empirical evidence that the method prescribed is effective (Drury, 2016).

(“Where there is obedience there cannot be *parrhesia*”, Foucault, 2011,

p. 336). The point here is that the superior clinicians are 'in love' with outcomes, making their accountability to their client more important than to any third party requirement, and this will show itself in their outcomes. A serendipitous finding by Miller and colleagues (2015) is that superior therapists are not so prone to burnout even though they tend to see more clients; burnout seems to be correlated with seeing more cases without successful outcomes and not being able to either pass those cases on or do anything else to change that. In keeping with the themes developed in this paper, it is predicted that as competence develops, clinicians will be able to remain present for longer getting a failing case back on track again. That is to say, when a case is 'stuck', they will not need to turn away and rack their brains or consult colleagues as much, as they are able to recognise "50,000 patterns" (to use Ericsson's example with chess grandmasters), and can see this case can also be viewed through, say a structural family therapy lens; and "now we can go on".

Conclusion

As we have seen, a new paradigm has emerged in cognitive psychology dissolving philosophical errors in our thinking; which is inviting us to see ourselves as a process seeking harmony with wider processes we live our lives in. Discovering that our sense of self is largely socially fabricated, we find ourselves drawn through ethical obligations to constitute ourselves anew, whereby we give expression to our

relational responsiveness in more aesthetic and ethical ways. Although now more authentic, we make no claim as to the reality of a core self nor the denial of one (Andersen, 1991).

Routine Outcome Monitoring tools (ROMs) can facilitate our self-discipline towards becoming more ethically responsive beings or what Foucault calls parrhēsiastes. Keeney (2012) describes therapy conducted as relational responsiveness, a “performative art”. In such performative art, the genesis (genealogy) of clients’ problems often reveal themselves to us, but as the school of solution-focused brief therapy has shown us, it is not always necessary to explore these to affect change. However, as we witness the genealogies of problems and solutions wax and wane, we are reminded of a more ancient wisdom found in our indigenous culture. These are further steps towards an ecology of mind.

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