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Whakawhanaungatanga: Inviting Relational Responsivity

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ABSTRACT

This paper offers a review of the emerging philosophy, cognitive science, and second-person neuroscience that supports the indigenous idea that communitarianism precedes the development of individualism. This review shows that this new perspective is consistent with Māoritanga, suggesting that Māori epistemology, philosophy of science, learning, and psychology are in many ways ahead of mainstream Euro-centric thinkers. As such this positions Māori, especially Māori psychologists, as the elder brother in guiding the younger brother to find his place of standing in Aotearoa. An analysis of the Three Baskets of Knowledge is offered.

Key Words: Primary Intersubjectivity, Empathy, Whakawhanaungatanga, Epistemology, Skill, 4E cognition

Pepeha

I was born in the morning shadow of Te Aroha Maunga

(Being under a mountain of love was fortuitous),

And my formative years were spent playing in the Piako River

('Piako' means 'emptiness' – the spiritual void from which form arises).

The gate to our swimming hole was through the Kai a Te Mata Marae, where

Rongoa Māori medicine and Pākehā medicine are now combined;

(In resonance with my own career callings).

Although the scholarly spirit of Wiremu Tamihana pervades this part of the

Waikato strongly, when I turn to my *tīpuna*, it's the *karanga* of my paternal grandmother, Emma I hear. The product of rape in the Northern Hawke's Bay in

1890, it is unlikely we'll know the *iwi* or *hapū* of the perpetrator until DNA

testing improves further. She then died in childbirth when not much more than

20 years of age and was buried without ceremony in a paupers grave in Karori.

She represents that growing cohort of Kiwis that have no local *tūrangawaewae*,

but belong here as much as those that do. I feel a strong responsibility to her and those she represents.

Waiata

Within You, Without You (George Harrison)

We were talking, about the space between us all
And the people, who hide themselves behind a wall of illusion
Never glimpse the truth, then it's far too late, when they pass away

We were talking, about the love we all could share
When we find it, to try our best to hold it there, with our love
With our love we could save the world, if they only knew

Try to realize it's all within yourself, no-one else can make you change
And to see you're really only very small
And life flows on within you and without you.

We were talking, about the love that's gone so cold
And the people who gain the world and lose their soul
They don't know, they can't see, are you one of them?

When you've seen beyond yourself
Then you may find peace of mind is waiting there
And the time will come when you see we're all one
And life flows on within and without you.

Whanaungatanga

During the twentieth century a number of philosophers, mainly phenomenologists, took a new direction in the exploration of *intersubjectivity*; the way we understand and relate to each other (Buber, 1937; Heidegger, 1962; Husserl, 1931; Levinas, 1998; Merleau-ponty, 1945; Overgaard, 2007). This subject is of immense importance, as our social theories and politics are rationalised on the basis of how we understand this. In the seventeenth Century Descartes led a dominant portion of Western culture to strongly believe that “the only mind I have direct access to is my own”, and thus a puzzle arose as to how we get to know the minds of others. Until recently, the dominant school in cognitive science, *cognitivism (or representationalism)*, where computer metaphors of the mind prevail, suggested that we access other minds by developing ‘theories of mind’ (ToM). An argument developed amongst these cognitivists as to whether these were pure hypothetico-deductive representations (“I infer from what I see you doing that you were thinking this”), the “Theory-ToM” (Baron-Cohen, 1995); or embodied simulations through mirror neurons and the like (“When I see that look I feel my own anger, and know that you are angry”) (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). However both of these accounts of intersubjectivity have fallen short. Wittgenstein (1980) for example noted: “In general I do not surmise fear in him – I see it. I do not feel that I am deducing the probable existence of something inside from something outside; rather it is as if the human face were in a way translucent and that I were seeing it not in reflected light but rather in its own” (§ 170). In other words, both models of ToM can be criticised on the grounds that I don’t have to look into myself or make an inference to recognise, say, the fury in his face (Gallagher 2005; Leudar & Costall,

2009). Indeed, Wittgenstein is noting that we *do* have direct access to other minds.

Merleau-Ponty (1945; 1964) also saw that we had direct access to other minds, and along with other phenomenologists is being picked up by philosophers, cognitive scientists, and second-person neuroscience this century, especially by those embracing the new paradigm of '4e-cognition' ('enactive', 'embodied', 'embedded', and 'extended') (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008; Menary, 2010; Newen et al, 2017; Noë, 2009; Schilbach, et al, 2013). 'Direct social perception' or the 'phenomenological proposal' (pp) now offers an alternative to both the simulation- and the theory-ToM as a way of understanding our (and some other animals) understanding of each other (Hutto et al, 2011; Froese & Leavens, 2014); or of breakdowns in this process (Gallagher & Varga, 2015). As a result it is now becoming more widely accepted that non-human primates and human infants directly perceive the intention of another's action, and this is not achieved by inference, nor needs to await the development of a 'theory of mind' (which doesn't occur till around age 4 in humans). Merleau-Ponty's idea here is that we are born with an innate empathic responsiveness, and as this is not a hidden inner reality (as it might be in a Cartesian's speculation), so we are reacting to each other's empathic response from birth; resulting in a developing or deepening intersubjectivity (Daly, 2014). I don't just see you are happy or sad, but I respond to that, usually without deliberation. And you respond in turn, to say, my expression of concern. The possibility of deliberation only comes later in development, but underlying it is this direct primordial responsiveness that we are born with. So in this understanding of social

understanding we are dancing rather than mirroring each other (Newman-Norlund, et al, 2007).

Of course empathic responsiveness is not guaranteed, as there may be all manner of agendas and misreadings in play, especially once deliberation (or secondary intersubjectivity) becomes possible, and so attention and care is required at times to understand and to be felt understood. But that it can break down, indicates that it must have an underlying original basis, on the argument that you cannot falsify a behaviour unless you first know what the genuine thing looks like (Zahavi, 2001).

Now this primary intersubjectivity, our empathic responsiveness to each other, sets off a developmental process where our attention starts shifting back and forth between the “I” and the “we” perspective, and a sense of our own subjectivity is born (Gallagher, 2005; Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Spencer-Brown, 1994). Or as Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty all claimed, our subjectivity, or sense of self, is born from intersubjective responsiveness, or sociality. “I” comes from “we”. Or as the South African *Ubuntu* proverb puts it (contra Descartes): “I am because we are”. Because our empathic responsiveness is so intertwined with the other during this process where our subjectivity develops, a concern for fairness or the well-being of the other is central. Levinas (1998) in particular, but the other phenomenologists in general, stress that ethics stem from embodied embedded intuitions generated in the crucible of this primary intersubjectivity. For them, morals are rules imposed from without, whilst ethics arise from within our deeper sense of ‘us-ness’, which is primary not only developmentally, but also in the sense of underlying all social relationships.

A psychoanalytic take on this idea that subjectivity is an intersubjectivity, was provided a hundred years ago by the first American psychoanalyst, Trigant Burrow (1927; 1968). His insight was that mother is not the 'love object', as Freud and others insisted, but the 'love subject'. From the time of Charcot in 1870 onwards most of these early psychologists held the view that babies begin with a sense of unity of consciousness, or 'oneness', or what Romain Rolland was to later call 'oceanic consciousness'. In the hands of Freud the breast felt like part of the infant, until it is wanted and not there, at which time the breast (or mother) becomes the 'love object', which the infant longs to re-unite with. From this perspective the oedipal fantasy makes some sense, as an idea of us having wishful fantasies of a mother-child fusion appears logical. Now although Burrow agreed with the 'oceanic consciousness' idea, he argued that we objectify ourselves, and not the 'mother'. Like the Mahayana Buddhists and Taoists (whom Burrow (1964) approved of), he argued that we create or become pre-occupied with ourselves as an object, and lose sight of our primordial unity (which is still there). We become so filled with ideas about ourselves (especially if aided by culture) we become divided within ourselves, constantly viewing ourselves. As such we no longer experience the physiological harmony or feeling continuity we once had with the world and each other. He saw this as a species-wide disorder that lay beneath the various neuroses and psychoses that the 'psy' professions deal with, and if this deeper problem was resolved, then many of the psychoses and neuroses would also dissolve.

The philosopher John Dewey, and a number of anthropologists, criticised Burrow for not giving due concern to cultural variations, suggesting his thesis might

apply more to *h. euro-americanus* than *h. sapiens* in general (Burrow, 1968, pp. 45-58). Burrow agreed that certain “primitive peoples” [sic] have a degree of integration and coordination that surpasses those in the West, but they are just as prone to this neurosis, especially once individualism and competition is introduced. To safeguard against the destructiveness that follows in the wake of having one’s primary identity located in the “I”, Daly (2014) urges us to re-connect with our ‘we-centred consciousness’, because any concerns of justice are better met when our subjectivity is an intersubjectivity. Although there are variations in how the words might be interpreted, our Aotearoa term *whanaungatanga* appears very similar to the South African *ubuntu* or the Korean *shimcheong* (Valsiner & Han, 2008). As we all know, *whakawhanaungatanga*, getting to know our connections with each other, especially genealogical ones (*whakapapa*), is one of the first and most important ‘rituals’ on encounter with another. Māori cultures are built around our recognition of our ‘we-ness’, as are other ‘collectivist’ societies, or communitarian cultures or first-nations people, and have developed all manner of rituals to maintain our identity in the collective (Rappaport, 1999).

As noted above, Cartesian thinking generated a very individualistic mind, which in time, became puzzled as to how it understood other minds. For Hobbes (1651) this individualistic mind led to his vision of the natural state being one of “war of every man against every man” (sic) (p. 62). In this vision, humans are so “dissociated” from each other that we need a social contract and/or strong leadership to hold us together. So Rousseau and Locke put forward social contract theories, suggesting that as individuals we consent (either explicitly or

tacitly) to surrender some of our freedoms to the authority of the state in exchange for a “society of security” (Foucault, 2007, p. 11). This is now so pervasive in Euro-American culture that all manner of social organisation is based on social contracts, including our own psychologists’ Code of Ethics (NZ Psychological Society, 2002). This becomes quite apparent when we look to the Canadian psychologists’ code (2000) (from which the Aotearoa code was strongly sourced), which explicitly identifies itself as a social contract. As Williams (2004) argued, such contracts produce impossible standards as they over-intellectualize the moral rules one is expected to follow, and do not pay sufficient due to the ethical intuitions that arise with ‘we-centred consciousness’. Foucault (1977) noted that as European cultures have increasingly regulated people, especially during the industrial era, so too have they increasingly fabricated people; generating the dilemma of how we invite them back to ‘we-ness’.

Thus, although Pākehā may have brought much technology and life-extending fruits to Aotearoa, they are in need of *whakawhanaungatanga* if we are to escape the ecological and social destructiveness of individualism. James K Baxter once wrote: *‘Ko te Māori te tuakana. Ko to Pākehā te teina...’ The Māori is indeed the elder brother and the Pākehā the younger brother. But the teina has refused to learn from the tuakana. He has sat sullenly among his machines and account books, and wondered why his soul was full of bitter dust...*(Newton, 2009). If we are to find a way of being that is mutually empowering of people and the natural world, then “an indispensable resource in the fulfilment of this task is the guidance of the indigenous people” (Berry, 1999, p.x).

Three Baskets of Knowledge

I recently had to turn back a little short of the summit of *Te Aroha Maunga* when I took a grandson up, due to lack of fitness on my behalf. Over the years I have also endeavoured to penetrate the summit of the heavens to see more clearly the three baskets of knowledge and two sacred stones *Tāne* (or *Tāwhaki*) brought back. A number of current scholars have indicated that if due care is taken *mātauranga Māori* might be enriched or even evolved by consideration of non-Māori perspectives on numerous issues (including philosophical), and not necessarily further colonised or exploited (e.g., Roberts, 2013; Royal, 2003; Sadler, 2007). Or all cultures might benefit (Gillett, 2009). Indeed Tau (2001) has warned there is risk of some Māori writers imposing closed systems of beliefs (perhaps because of ‘information overload’, or theft of *taonga* fears), preventing further development of *mātauranga Māori*. Royal (2003) argues that the epistemology of *mātauranga Māori* has yet to have been subjected to a rigorous exploration, although the philosopher Gillett (2009) has written on the subject since. Māori Marsden (2003) informs us that the three baskets legend required a key to unravel it, as it was part of the corpus of sacred knowledge (not generally shared) (p. 57). The unknown editor of the first Māori website (maaori.com, 2017), notes that although the story is Māori, it will be appreciated and perhaps understood “by the mythologically, spiritually and mystically inclined of all cultures”. However, lets first note, perhaps as a warning to all scholars exploring this story, that *Tāne*’s older brother *Wiro* believed he was

more entitled to the baskets and sent various plagues upon *Tāne*, making his task more difficult.

To date this legend seems to have been mostly interpreted in the sociological sense of *mātauranga* as a body of knowledge, and thus the baskets contain different clusters of conceptual knowledge, like knowledge that helps us, knowledge of rituals, and knowledge of evil. However from an epistemological viewpoint, we are asking a different question; we are asking what is the nature of knowledge and how do we acquire it? Now some philosophers see their task as one of making explicit what is implicit (but not hidden). Often we have become ensnared in a distorted analogy, say, in this case, of how knowledge is acquired or works. Such distorted analogies are preventing us from seeing what's right before our eyes. From this perspective of philosophy, *apophatic* philosophers (which is akin to deconstructionism today, or is like sculpture in that it removes to reveal) like Wittgenstein (for example), can be seen to be engaging in a form of therapy, not for getting a better theory, but for seeing the world more clearly (Williams, 2010). For example, as we saw above Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty both noticed that we do have direct access to the minds of others, and by making this explicit they dissolved the distorted picture Descartes had painted. We are closer to each other than we thought. Now two of the greatest apophatic philosophers (or theologians) to have wrestled with the epistemological question were the sixth century Syrian (?) monk Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (1920; Watts, 1971), who strongly influenced Christian theology; and the second century Indian philosopher Nāgārjuna (Siderits & Katsura, 2013), whose *Madhyamaka* dialect became the 'middle way' of Mahayana Buddhism

(Zen). Now these apophatic philosophers sometimes use imaginary scenarios, such as a hierarchy of angels (as Dionysius does), to get us to reflect on practices we engage in, so we can see what we are doing more clearly. Obviously the danger is, that instead of aiding in the removal of false pictures, it leads us further into a supposed metaphysical reality behind appearances, and we actually start believing in angels and another world beyond this one. (The word 'sin' comes from the Greek *hamartia* which means to miss the mark; and to 'sin against the light' is to miss the point when it's crystal clear. With regards to supposed metaphysical realities, Wittgenstein once commented: "My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul" (1958, p. 178))

Since the seventeenth century conversations about the infinite have increasingly shifted from theology to mathematics, with the philosopher Wittgenstein, for example, claiming that he saw all philosophical problems from a religious point of view, and that his greatest contribution was in the philosophy of mathematics (Rodych, 2011). As noted Pseudo-Dionysius, Nāgārjuna and Wittgenstein were all apophatic philosophers (or constructivists, or better deconstructivists), arguing that mathematical "truths", unlike genuine propositions about things in the world, have no subject matter, and are just referring to their own constructed realities. "The mathematician is not a discoverer; he [sic] is an inventor" (Wittgenstein, 1980, p.111). There are no mathematical facts, just useful constructs for doing things in the world, like dividing up this pie. However, like some theology before it, it has a very strong ability to seduce our attention away from the world. Thus in Wittgenstein's philosophy of

mathematics there are no infinite series: “[i]nfinite possibility is not a quantity” (Wittgenstein, 1975, §138).

Let’s take a step further into the epistemology of mathematics, and hopefully not lose the non-mathematically minded. If we take a mathematical operation, like the act of counting for example, we see that natural numbers are generated by repeating the operation (what we are doing) on its result. (“An operation can take one of its own results as its base”, Wittgenstein, 1922, §5.251.) So in the genealogy or *whakapapa* of numbers there is the repeating operation (called ‘**intensions**’ by mathematicians), and the naming (e.g. 1, 2, 3, etc., called ‘**extensions**’ by mathematicians). Now if we go to the “highest heaven”, (or perhaps “the innermost heaven”), so to speak, we see that the most primal intellectual act, is the act of drawing a distinction. “In the beginning was the deed” (Goethe, 1832, p.39). But in drawing a distinction we are implying a duality, the ‘thing’ and what it is not. But this also *“implies a triplicity: what the thing is, what it isn’t, and the boundary between them. Thus you cannot indicate anything without defining two states, and you cannot define two states without creating three elements. None of these exist in reality, or separately from the others”* (Spencer-Brown, 1994, p. viii). As a pupil of Wittgenstein, Spencer-Brown saw here the celestial hierarchy of Pseudo-Dionysius and the logic of Nāgārjuna (“is”, “is not”, and “both is and is not”); for as our attention shifts again and again between these three elements (the ‘intension’ repeated), a ‘reality’ is constructed (Spencer-Brown, 1972). For example, we saw above that Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty drew our attention to how we do have direct access to other minds, and if you considered this possibility then your attention

switched back and forth between viewing where we do and where we don't have this direct access. As we engaged in this deliberating process the reality of what they were saying became clearer to discern. M.C. Escher's graphic 'Verbum 1942' perhaps illustrates this 'emergence' of a reality in a manner suggestive of Pseudo-Dionysius's celestial hierarchy. (Elsewhere in Escher are expressions of what we call the koru spiral of eternity and whakapapa, or in mathematical philosophy the pattern of 'intension' we see when it uses its own results as a base repetitively, e.g. a Fibonacci sequence.)

Perhaps the closest to this interpretation of the 'Tāne and the three baskets legend' is Māori Marsden's (2003) of *tuatea* being light or present knowledge, of *tauri* being darkness or things unknown, and of *aronui* being pursuit or what we are seeking. A scholar whose first language is *te reo* might be better positioned to explore this apparent parallel with "is", "is not", and "both is and is not" (i.e. Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamaka* dialect).

The Acquisition of a Skill

The Wittgensteinian and phenomenological scholar Hubert Dreyfus and his mathematician brother developed a model of how skills are acquired (1980, 1986), which sheds further light on this, and can also be utilised to bring a number of other Māori epistemological concepts to the discussion. We begin with Wittgenstein's (1958) observation of at least three quite different ways we use the word 'know' (§78); which we will call here 'conceptual knowledge' (e.g. Te Aroha is 953 metres high), 'performance' knowledge (e.g. how to haka), and

'perceptual' knowledge (e.g. recognizing the sound of a clarinet). We saw above, in the metaphysics of Madhyamaka etc., there was a *perception* of a difference, which was accompanied by the action of attending (a *performance*), and which found expression in *naming* or identifying that which caught our attention. As Spencer-Brown noted in the quote above, none of these aspects are separate from the others in the beginning or potentially (i.e., in "heaven"); but here in the world we can discern these as manifesting in different types of knowledge, as Wittgenstein does. Perhaps suggestive of the allegorical nature of 'knowing' we frequently slip in everyday conversations between these different types of knowledge when talking about 'knowledge'; but it may be useful to keep them separate and see how they interact during skill development, as it may shed further light on the three baskets of knowledge and the nature of adaptation.

Although Dreyfuses' initial idea of five specific stages in skill development has been questioned, their central thesis is still chosen by researchers into skill acquisition (e.g. Allan et al, 2016). In the initial stages the learner is engaging in self-monitoring (and/or teacher monitoring), where there is a constant referral to the rules. 'Know that' or 'conceptual knowledge' dominates. However as proficiency develops the rules are not internalised or increasingly abstracted (as cognitivists like Fodor 2003 would have it), but replaced by 'know how' (performance knowledge). We recognise patterns more quickly which we respond to reflexively. Longer periods of experience doesn't necessarily lead to higher levels of performance, but it does make it more effortless and automatic. If we think of everyday activities like walking or talking, we can see that these are now totally 'know how'; indeed stuttering might be considered a delay at the

rule-obeying level. However proficiency doesn't lead to expertise (especially in skills like playing chess or doing psychotherapy); for that to occur 'deliberate practice' is required so that our perceptual knowledge is enhanced further (Ericsson, 2017). Like Simon and Chase (1973) before them, the Dreyfus brothers identified 'pattern recognition reflexive responding' (or the circumvention of working memory) as the hallmark of proficiency. To become an expert we then need to broaden the repertoire of perceptions we reflexively respond to. At first it was thought that top tennis players and batsmen had faster neural systems, but they didn't (Müller & Abernethy, 2012). Similarly top chess players don't have superior memories. What they have is a broader range of perceptions or pattern recognitions to reflexively respond to. The ball players have become more perceptive in anticipating the balls trajectory from the server's preparatory movements. The grand master in chess can recognise 50,000 patterns at a glance (Ericsson, 2009). Immediate feedback is the best key to developing this pattern recognition reflexivity, although some 'know that' study might also be helpful (Ericsson, 2017).

Another feature in skill acquisition, not noticed by the Cartesian 'cognitivist', but now central in 4E cognition, is that once we achieve proficiency, once the skill has become a matter of 'know how', the skill "has become so much a part of him [sic] that he needs be no more aware of it than he is of his own body" (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p.30). However, not only has the skill become embodied, but mind has become extended. "Rather than being aware they are flying an aeroplane, they have the experience they are flying" (p.12). The car feels like part of me, I feel my wheels on the road. (Or as Royal (2007) puts in

regards to *mātauranga Māori*, “...the abandonment of explicit knowledge in favour of an equivalence between knowledge and the world (*tohu*)” (p.1.).

Expertise then, is the ability to stay more here and now present and at one with world, as we have increased the repertoire of potential perceptual patterns we reflexively respond to (Noë 2012). Adaptation is our ability to return a state of attunement with the world.

With mastery, the experts “often cannot articulate their knowledge because much of their knowing is tacit” (Ericsson, 2006, p. 24). ‘Know that’ has moved to this secondary role of now being expressions, and not guiding rules, of our ‘perceptual knowledge’ (recognitions) and ‘know how’ intuitive responding. However, at times we may find ourselves reflecting on new patterns we’ve noticed and found ourselves reacting to. “Deliberation is certainly used by the experts, if time permits, but is done for the purpose of improving intuition, not replacing it” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005, p. 779). The 4E cognition paradigm argues that the highest form of learning are computations done without representations, or without the manipulation of symbols; because with embodied or enactive cognition we are using our senses to probe for a way forward (which we might express symbolically after the fact) (Menary, 2010). A parable for staying sharp in this manner was offered by Chuang Tzu (Zhuang Zhou) in the 4th century BC. A cook has not had to sharpen his knife in nineteen years because he lets it find its way through the gaps in the meat; and when it comes to a piece of gristle or bone, he allows it to slow down and find its way through the gaps there too (Watson, 1996). Thus continuing competence programmes for professionals might look more to the use of outcome monitoring

tools for maintaining or increasing ‘sharpness’ of psychotherapists, rather than have them make representations from self-observation of their performance (Drury, 2017b). Or that ‘deliberate practice’ takes priority over ‘further training’ in professional development (ten Cate, 2010). This is the open-mindedness of adaptive expertise.

Royal (2007) explains *mōhiotanga* as embedded knowledge, which is tacit and embodied in activity, and doesn’t require an exchange of knowledge. He exemplifies this by citing numerous instincts, and thus appears consistent with ‘performance knowledge’ (or ‘know how’) as expressed here. In the educational philosophy of *te whatu pōkeka* (Walker, 2008), it’s what we start with or bring to a learning situation. But it is also what we end with, for as Marsden (2003) notes, ‘knowing’ (*mohio*) belongs to the heart and not the head (p.79). This indicates that Māori had an understanding of learning that is consistent with the 4E cognitive paradigm (Newen et al, 2017), which has only appeared in the West this century. *Te whatu pōkeka* uses the word *mātauranga* to describe the *process* of negotiation or educating (when we look to explicit exchangeable concepts or rules for guidance); and amongst the many uses of the word *mātauranga* it is also used to refer to the conceptual knowledge itself (Royal, 2007).

Māramatanga is the word for when we ‘get it’ (understanding, enlightenment, clarity), and in the words of Wittgenstein (1958), where we say “now I can go on” (§154). The perceptual learning has occurred. Skill mastery, then, takes us through a stage of awkwardness as we monitor ourselves, or use training wheels, but eventually returns us to our primary intersubjectivity, albeit in a more artful form.

We see this comparison of embodied knowledge (*mōhiotanga*) with 'aboutness knowledge' (*mātauranga*) in Salmond's (2005) account of eighteenth century Polynesian and European navigators. Although some of the European sailors had also acquired an embodied knowledge of the seas and the stars etc., they seldom had bloodshot eyes from staying awake for long periods to maintain unity with the world. The Europeans could turn to their technical instruments, charts, and drilled routines. But at the cost of some atrophy in their 'know how' skills, and intimate relationship with the world. Most indigenous people have various rituals and prayers to express this sense of unity or spiritual oneness with the world, which appears to be superstitious gibberish, or as Fraser described it, pre-scientific attempts to manipulate fate. But as Wittgenstein (1979) pointed out, Frazer had failed to see that the soldier who kisses a photo of his beloved before going into battle is not trying to manipulate fate, but reminding himself, and giving expression to a sentiment that made this endeavour meaningful. Similarly the *karakia* reminds us of the *tikanga*, and without it the risk of *tekanga* (or loss of harmony) with our *whanaungatanga* (Gillett, 2009). As we saw in the first section, such rituals are a *whakawhanaungatanga* and its ethics.

Polynesian Science

Pre-colonial knowledge acquisition may be favourably compared with Goethe's delicate empiricism (Seamon & Zajonc, 1998), in that both take a

phenomenological intuitive-based approach. Like Goethe, Sadler (2007) describes the method as one of making oneself identical with 'other' (the thing studied), so that the *whanaungatanga* or network of relationships it stems from is sensed. *Nohopuku*, a form of meditation is useful in achieving this (Royal, 1996; Salmond, 2013). Thus the natural unity of the world is attuned to, and then a variety of genealogies (*whakapapa*) may show themselves (Roberts, 2013). Now whereas Cartesian-based science aims at a 'grand theory of everything' (or as the Duhem-Quine thesis has it, at a minimum a hypothesis that's coherent with other theories), Polynesian science has a different aim. It seeks a 'grand experience of everything' (*Te Ao Mārama*). Whereas the Cartesian takes a more engineering approach in wanting to acquire 'aboutness knowledge' (conceptual knowledge) to leverage the world; the Polynesian is developing *tikanga* (practices, customs) that enhance our 'know how' to live in harmony more economically. Or what we might call "withness knowledge" (Shotter, 2011). In this respect Polynesian science finds resonance with Wittgenstein's philosophy, which seeks perspicuity or clarity as an end in itself, rather than about something (Drury, 2011). Again a return to our primary intersubjectivity, albeit in a more sophisticated form.

Relational Responsibility

The 1865 Native Lands Act has been described as an 'act of war' in that it required there be no more than 10 owners for any block of land (regardless of size), thereby dispossessing large percentages of people from every iwi and hapu from their land, and breaking up the communitarianism of Māori cultures

(Binney,1990). Māori were thus forced into contract law, encouraged to be more individualistic and sell land, resulting in an almost total loss of the North Island by Māori in the ensuing 100 years. Since 1975 there have been increasing claims and settlements of *Tiriti o Waitangi* breaches by the Waitangi Tribunal. However the vexing question of our responsibilities to those who were not only dispossessed of their land, but also of their identity remains unaddressed. As McIntosh (2005) observes, “identities by their very nature, are in a state of flux” (p.69), and although ‘fixed’ for some, are just as easily ‘fluid’ or even ‘forced’ (assigned) for others. For those in a more ‘fluid’ situation (e.g. those with mixed heritage), motivation plays an important role in determining who might identify as Māori or non-Māori in Aotearoa (Te Huia, 2015). On signing the Treaty Hōne Heke commented on the children that will unite the races; and now that we have a growing population of people with a ‘fluid’ identity, we have additional responsibilities under *Tiriti o Waitangi*.

During the last couple of years of his life the French social historian Michel Foucault increasingly explored the implications of primary intersubjectivity, with regard to the society or culture we might cultivate (2010; 2011). His earlier work (1977) had shown that Cartesianism and social contract thinking had reached it’s high point in a form of governance known as ‘panopticism’; which is where we are all encouraged to ‘gaze’ upon ourselves in the mirror of ‘normalizing judgements’. It is the mechanism we see in play in the Psychologists Board’s Continuing Competence Programme. Foucault saw panopticism resulting in ‘fabricated selves’ maintaining Cartesian individualism, and discouraging connectivity with each other and the world (2008). This

individualism has been further accelerated by neoliberal politics, which many now see as generating mental health epidemics and ecological disasters (e.g. Monbiot, 2016; Ursano et al, 2007).

Foucault identified a significant “Cartesian moment” occurring about a thousand years ago, with the introduction of the confessional (Foucault, 2001, p.14). The confessional shifted our ‘gaze’ from ‘care of self and others’ to ‘knowing the self’ (conceptually). Prior to that ‘moment’, European culture encouraged the cultivation of a form of self-ethics it had inherited from the Greeks and Romans, that centred on self- and other-care. The Church began insisting that people couldn’t be trusted with self-ethics, and needed to acknowledge they were sinners needing the guidance of the Church. This radically changed the Europeans way of dealing with conceptual knowledge and ideas about the ‘truth’. Strange as it may sound to our ear today, for the Greeks “one could not be impure, immoral, and know the truth” (Foucault, 1984, p.372). Perhaps more accurately, we could say “express the truth”, for as we have seen in Goethe’s delicate empiricism, or Sadler’s description of Polynesian science, one needs to be in tune with the world and others in order to perceive and then express the patterns one discerns. We see this expression of deep intuitions in some scientists and mathematicians (e.g. Newton or Ramanujan), which as Spencer-Brown (1994) notes, takes years of contemplation to achieve (p. 110). For the Greeks, this ‘truth’ was ‘wisdom’, a perceptual-performance knowledge, which we express conceptually. But with the introduction of the confessional, the Church now has us eating off the tree of conceptual knowledge, for rationality or reason on its own could allow us to have access to the truth: at first a conceptual

truth about ourselves. This was the moment when truth became clearly disembodied.

In Foucault's analysis, the Greek Delphic Oracle's "know thyself" was a plea to recognise (perceptual knowledge) oneself as a relationally responsive being, or as described here, to recognise one's primary intersubjectivity. Now this responsivity leads to a recognition of one's responsibilities to oneself and others. For the Greek and Roman senators there was a responsibility to care for "the wife", "the boy", and "the citizens" one governed (Foucault, 1986). In turn, this called for a degree of self-care or self-discipline, for unless one looked after oneself one was at risk of not being able to carry out one's responsibilities to others. We see this same ethic in play in Māoritanga when the *kīngitanga* movement arose in the nineteenth century. A number of prominent chiefs at the time declined the invitation to be the Māori king not just on the basis of mana and leadership qualities, but because they recognised their *iwi* did not have access to the considerable resources the burden of continuous hospitality would bring upon them (Ballara, 1996). The Greeks called this discipline of self- and other-care '*epimeleia heautou*'.

Perhaps the most important thing to recognise about *epimeleia heautou* is that it is a form of self-discipline that is not a struggle against oneself. We witness this in many women (not all), who on discovering they are pregnant, find little difficulty giving up smoking or drinking. Now all manner of psychotherapies, especially for intimate partner violence (e.g. Cooper & Rickard, 2016; Jenkins, 1990, Vall et al, 2016), addiction (Alexander, 2008; Hari, 2015), and psychosis

(Seikkula, 2011), are finding in this invitation to primary intersubjectivity, or relational responsiveness, *epimeleia heautou*, or *whakawhanaungatanga*, a simple and obvious path to recovery. As the Levinasian scholar Richard Cohen (2002) put it: “*The road from mental illness to mental health is not to create from a shattered ego a fortress ego, but to regain one’s obligations, one’s responsibilities to and for the other*” (p. 48). Indeed, a call has been made that the ‘psy’ industry should be repositioned from ‘health’ to ‘welfare’ for the implication from primary intersubjectivity studies is that we are dealing with a loss of the self-other-care that comes with loss of primary intersubjectivity; and thus it would be more appropriate to talk of ‘mental welfare’ rather than ‘mental health’ (Drury, 2017a).

Turangawaewae

The question also arises with the recognition of the many implications of primary intersubjectivity as to whether Māori psychologists belong in the ‘clinical psychology whare’. Clinical psychology is strongly constructed around Cartesian assumptions of primarily knowing (conceptually) ‘Other’ as an object, and then leveraging change via an empirically validated (or supported) treatment (EVT). As numerous writers in the recently published text on indigenous psychology in Aotearoa (Waitoki & Levy, 2016) attest, there is great difficulty in practicing *whakawhanaungatanga*, despite the obvious powerfully transformative effect it has, when an injunction has been given during clinical training to be judicious and sparing in sharing personal information. Māori psychologists might find their *tikanga* fits better in the ‘counselling psychology

whare'. It is not difficult to mount an argument that by the very act of being in the 'clinical psychology whare', we are supporting colonization by tacitly endorsing Cartesian individualism.

Further, the shift to counselling psychology also invites a shift to what Wampold (2015) calls the 'contextual model of psychotherapy', which he shows, has far stronger empirical evidence supporting it than any particular EVT (like CBT). As we see from the models developed above, skill acquisition involves a broadening of one's perceptual response field, perhaps by incorporating ideas from a diverse range of psychotherapies (Duncan, 2010). When combined with outcome monitoring tools, a pathway is opened to enhance effectiveness for most psychotherapists (Miller, et al, 2015). Furthermore, this shift to a more contextual model opens the door to the way of life Seikkula calls 'Open Dialogue'. Seikkula (2011) says: "I feel uneasy to name [this approach] as a therapeutic *method*" (p. 191). He reports the difficulties he experiences in teaching professional therapists 'Open Dialogue' (which has been highly successful with psychosis), is because they struggle to drop their trained habits of imposing structure (therapeutic plans) on their sessions and just be with the client in dialogue. But this is the *tikanga* of *whanaungatanga*, or primary intersubjectivity; through the very action of sharing we invite the other back into their relational responsivity, without any deliberate intention to do so. In this respect, Jeb Brown (2016), the director of the largest US outcome monitoring database company, has noticed that clients with SMIs (Serious Mental Illnesses) are particularly (aversely) sensitive to therapists with an agenda for them.

As we invite more psychologists to the reality of humanity's primary intersubjectivity, and thus the central importance of *whanaungatanga* we also are called to review the position(s) we might take in identity politics in Aotearoa. In his Waitangi Day address in 1989, Chief Judge of the Māori Land Court, Eddie Durie, noted that if Māori are the *tangata whenua* (the original people of the land), then the Pākehā are the *tangata tiriti*, those who belong to the land by right of *Te Tiriti* (King, 2004, p. 167). As such *Te Tiriti* calls on both parties to recognise their obligations to form a partnership that benefits the community. As we have seen identity can be fixed, fluid, or forced (assigned) (McIntosh, 2005). Te Huia (2015) notes that some of the familiar markers of Māori identity includes knowledge of *whakapapa*, *mātauranga Māori*, *te reo Māori*, and visible features like racially defining characteristics, *tā moko* and the display of *taonga*. But in assigning identity how many or much of these markers need to be present to declare someone as Māori? What New Zealander today does not feel the sentiment of the *haka*; what New Zealander does not know some *te reo Māori*? Indeed, are we not all becoming Māori? There seems no doubt that we do need to protect and maintain a population of first language *te reo Māori* speakers, they are a *taonga* and the essence of our cultural uniqueness. However it is also time to acknowledge Hōne Heke's vision of our children uniting us and we become one people. The *whakawhanaungatanga* of psychologists in Aotearoa will include such identity politics.

Conclusion

This paper has reviewed the growing body of evidence that human nature is such that we have a reflexive primary intersubjectivity with each other, which we see clearly expressed in our Māori heritage. This primary intersubjectivity was lost touch with in European culture about a thousand years ago. That loss facilitated the development of all sorts of technical and life-extending technologies for the Europeans, but at the cost of losing touch with that which connects them to each other and the world. Socially then, Māori are the elder brother (*te tuakana*), and now have the unenviable task of inviting the non-Māori to discover their *whanaungatanga*, not only to each other, but also the world. Fortunately a number of developments in philosophy, cognitive science, and second-person neuroscience can now assist this process, as they affirm Māori epistemologies, science, and psychology. These are further steps to an ecology of mind.

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